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JOHANNEs ANDENAS t
"For what mortal is righteous if he nothing fear?"
(Aeschylus in the Eumenides)
I. THE CONCEPT OF GENERAL PREVENTION
In continental theories of criminal law, a basic distinction is made
between the effects of punishment on the man being punished-indi-
vidual prevention or special prevention-and the effects of punishment
upon the members of society in general-general prevention. The
characteristics of special prevention are termed "deterrence," "reforma-
tion" and "incapacitation," and these terms have meanings similar to
their meanings in the English speaking world. General prevention,
on the other hand, may be described as the restraining influences
emanating from the criminal law and the legal machinery.
By means of the criminal law, and by means of specific applica-
tions of this law, "messages" are sent to members of a society. The
criminal law lists those actions which are liable to prosecution, and
it specifies the penalties involved. The decisions of the courts and
actions by the police and prison officials transmit knowledge about the
law, underlining the fact that criminal laws are not mere empty threats,
and providing detailed information as to what kind of penalty might
be expected for violations of specific laws. To the extent that these
stimuli restrain citizens from socially undesired actions which they
might otherwise have committed, a general preventive effect is secured.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Criminology and Criminal
Law, University of Oslo. Cand. jur. 1935, Dr. jur. 1943, University of Oslo.
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While the effects of special prevention depend upon how the law is
implemented in each individual case, general prevention occurs as a
result of an interplay between the provisions of the law and its enforce-
ment in specific cases. In former times, emphasis was often placed
on the physical exhibition of punishment as a deterrent influence, for
example, by performing executions in public. Today it is customary
to emphasize the threat of punishment as such. From this point of
view the significance of the individual sentence and the execution of
it lies in the support that these actions give to the law. It may be
that some people are not particularly sensitive to an abstract threat of
penalty, and that these persons can be motivated toward conformity
only if the penalties can be demonstrated in concrete sentences which
they feel relevant to their own life situations.
The effect of the criminal law and its enforcement may be mere
deterrence. Because of the hazards involved, a person who con-
templates a punishable offense might not act. But it is not correct
to regard general prevention and deterrence as one and the same
thing. The concept of general prevention also includes the moral or
socio-pedagogical influence of punishment. The "messages" sent by
law and the legal processes contain factual information about what
would be risked by disobedience, but they also contain proclamations
specifying that it is wrong to disobey. Some authors extend the
concept of deterrence so that it includes the moral influences of the
law and is, thus, synonymous with general prevention.' In this
article, however, the term deterrence is used in the more restrictive
sense.
The moral influence of the criminal law may take various forms.
It seems to be quite generally accepted among the members of society
that the law should be obeyed even though one is dissatisfied with it
and wants it changed. If this is true, we may conclude that the law
as an institution itself to some extent creates conformity. But more
important than this formal respect for the law is respect for the values
which the law seeks to protect. It may be said that from law and the
legal machinery there emanates a flow of propaganda which favors
such respect. Punishment is a means of expressing social disapproval.
In this way the criminal law and its enforcement supplement and
enhance the moral influence acquired through education and other non-
legal processes. Stated negatively, the penalty neutralizes the de-
moralizing consequences that arise when people witness crimes being
perpetrated.
Deterrence and moral influence may both operate on the conscious
level. The potential criminal may deliberate about the hazards in-
1 See, e.., TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CoRRECTIoN 247 (1960).
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volved, or he may be influenced by a conscious desire to behave law-
fully. However, with fear or moral influence as an intermediate link,
it is possible to create unconscious inhibitions against crime, and
perhaps to establish a condition of habitual lawfulness. In this case,
illegal actions will not present themselves consciously as real alterna-
tives to conformity, even in situations where the potential criminal
would run no risk whatsoever of being caught.
General preventive effects do not occur only among those who
have been informed about penal provisions and their applications.
Through a process of learning and social imitation, norms and taboos
may be transmitted to persons who have no idea about their origins-
in much the way that innovations in Parisian fashions appear in the
clothing of country girls who have never heard of Dior or Lanvin.
Making a distinction between special prevention and general
prevention is a useful way of calling attention to the importance of
legal punishment in the lives of members of the general public, but the
distinction is also to some extent an artificial one. The distinction is
simple when one discusses the reformative and incapacitative effects of
punishment on the individual criminal. But when one discusses the
deterrent effects of punishment the distinction becomes less clear.
Suppose a driver is fined ten dollars for disregarding the speed limit.
He may be neither reformed nor incapacitated but he might, perhaps,
drive more slowly in the future. His motivation in subsequent situa-
tions in which he is tempted to drive too rapidly will not differ funda-
mentally from that of a driver who has not been fined; in other words
a general preventive effect will operate. But for the driver who has
been fined, this motive has, perhaps, been strengthened by the recollec-
tion of his former unpleasant experience. We may say that a general
preventive feature and special preventive feature here act together.
Let me hasten to point out here that so far I have only presented
a kind of conceptual framework. Determination of the extent to
which such general preventive effects exist, and location of the social
conditions that are instrumental in creating them, are empirical prob-
lems which will be discussed in this paper.
II. A NEGLECTED FIELD oF RESEARCH
General prevention has played a substantial part in the philosophy
of the criminal law. It is mentioned in Greek philosophy, and it is
basic in the writings of Beccaria, Bentham and Fenerbach. According
to Feuerbach, for example, the function of punishment is to create a
"psychological coercion" among the citizens 2 The threat of penalty,
2 FEUERBACH, LEHEBUcH DES GFmEINEN IN DEUTSCELAND PEIMICHEN RECHTS
117 (1812).
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consequently, had to be specified so that, in the mind of the potential
malefactor, the fear of punishment carried more weight than did the
sacrifice involved in refraining from the offense. The use of punish-
ment in individual cases could be justified only because punishment
was necessary to render the threat effective. The earlier writers were
concerned mainly with the purely deterrent effects of punishment,
while the moral effect of punishment has been subjected to detailed
analysis in more recent theories, especially in Germany and in the
Scandinavian countries.'
Notions of general prevention also have played a major part in
legislative actions. This was especially apparent a hundred or a
hundred and fifty years ago when the classical school was dominant.
The Bavarian Penal Code of 1813, copied by many countries, was
authored by Feuerbach and fashioned on his ideas. In more recent
years, there has been an increasing tendency to emphasize special pre-
vention. The judge now has greater discretion in deciding the length
of sentences and he has at his disposal several alternatives to the
classical prison sentence. But these changes have not altered the basic
character of the system. Unlike mental health acts, penal laws are
not designed as prescriptions for people who are in need of treatment
because of personality troubles. While there are some exceptions,
such as sexual psychopath acts and provisions in penal laws about
specific measures to be used when dealing with mentally abnormal
people or other special groups of delinquents, penal laws are primarily
fashioned to establish and defend social norms. As a legislature tries
to decide whether to extend or to restrict the area of punishable
offenses, or to increase or mitigate the penalty, the focus of attention
usually is on the ability of penal laws to modify patterns of behavior.
This is the basic question in current debates about the legal treatment
of homosexuality, abortion, public prostitution and drunken driving.
From the point of view of sheer logic one must say that general pre-
vention--i.e., assurance that a minimum number of crimes will be
committed-must have priority over special prevention--ie., impeding
a particular criminal from future offenses. If general prevention were
one hundred percent effective, there would obviously be no need for
the imposition of penalties in individual cases.
Ideas about general prevention also have had great effects on the
sentencing policies of courts. Sometimes this becomes manifest in a
3 A full account of the theories of general prevention is to be found in AGGE,
STUDIER OVER DET STRAFFRATTSLiGA REAKTIoNSSYSTEmET (Studies in the System of
Penal Sanctions) (1939). See also AUBERT, Om STRAFFENS SosIALE FUNKSJON
(The Social Function of Punishment) (1954); KINBERG, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
CRIMINOLOGY (1935); OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (1939); Andenaes, General Pre-
vention--Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRni. L., C. & P.S. 176 (1952).
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dramatic way. In September, 1958, international attention was
aroused when the criminal court of Old Bailey sentenced nine young
boys, six of them only seventeen years old, to four years of imprison-
ment for having taken part in race riots involving the use of force
against colored people in the Notting Hill district in London.' The
sentences were considerably heavier than previous sentences in similar
cases, and they were meant to be and were regarded as a strong warn-
ing to others." Another example occurred in 1945 when the Nor-
wegian Supreme Court sentenced Quisling to death. The first voting
judge expressed ideas of general prevention in the following words:
In a country's hour of fate chaos must not be allowed to
reign. And facing the present and the future it must be made
clear that a man who, in a critical time in the nation's history,
substitutes his own will for the will of constitutional institu-
tions and consequently betrays his country, for him his
country has no room."
Ordinarily, there is less drama in the sentencing activities of the
courts. The individual decision generally remains within the estab-
lished tradition of sentencing. But there is no doubt that considera-
tions of general prevention have been important in establishing these
patterns. In Norway, the Supreme Court is the court of last resort
in matters of sentencing, and it gives reasons for its decisions. General
prevention is frequently mentioned. For example, the Supreme Court
has established the principle that for reasons of general prevention sus-
pended sentences are not ordinarily imposed in cases involving the use
of motor vehicles while in a state of intoxication or in cases involving
the use of force against the police.
While general prevention has occupied and still occupies a central
position in the philosophy of criminal law, in penal legislation and in
the sentencing policies of the courts, it is almost totally neglected in
criminology and sociology.7 It is a deplorable fact that practically
no empirical research is being carried out on the subject. In both
current criminological debates and the literature of criminology, state-
ments about general prevention are often dogmatic and emotional.
They are proclamations of faith which are used as arguments either in
favor of or in opposition to the prevailing system. On one hand, we
find those who favor authority, severity and punishment; on the other
hand those who believe in understanding, treatment and measures of
social welfare. The vast majority of criminologists seem to have adopted
4 WooTON, CRIME AND THE CRmINAL LAW 100-01 (1963).
5 Ibid.
6 116 NoRsK RETSTIDENDE 109 (1945).
7 It is particularly noteworthy that American criminological research, which is
carried out mainly by sociologists, has not been concerned with general prevention.
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the second position, and sweeping statements are sometimes put forth
as scientific facts. Let me quote a few examples. Barnes and Teeters
hold that: "The claim for deterrence is belied by both history and
logic. History shows that severe punishments have never reduced
criminality to any marked degree." 8 John Ellington has tried to give
psychological foundation for the idea: "The belief that punishment
protects society from crime by deterring would-be law breakers will
not stand up before our new understanding of human behavior." '
Frequently it is asserted in rather strong terms that the idea of general
prevention is merely ancient superstition supported by conservative
jurists who have no knowledge whatsoever of human nature. During
a debate in 1935, a prominent prison authority in my own country
stated:
With us it is chiefly among the prison authorities and the
psychiatrists that we find the supporters of the new ideas [i.e.,
special prevention]. And this is no coincidence, for they
study man, while the jurists chiefly read books and files.
When a man learns to know and understand criminals he is
likely to lose faith in the general preventive effects of punish-
ment and, on the whole, to lose faith in the effectiveness of
heavy penalties as a weapon in the war against crime, unless
his mental arteries have hardened. He will come to realize
that in this struggle entirely different methods produce the
actual result."0
It is important that empirical questions about the effects of the
penal system on the behavior of citizens become detached from ideo-
logical arguments so that they can be discussed dispassionately and
without bias. As long as no research results are available, legislators
and judges necessarily must base their decisions on common sense
alone. We should focus on the neglected issue, which is to what
degree, and under which conditions, it is possible to direct the
behavior of citizens by means of the threat of punishment. This
again is part of the more comprehensive problem of determining the
extent to which citizens can be guided by means of legal rules.
III. SOME ERRONEOUS INFERENCES ABOUT GENERAL PREVENTION
Certain untenable contentions are frequently introduced in various
forms into discussions of general prevention, and it might be helpful
to clear them away before we proceed.
8 BARNEs & TEETERS, NEW HoRIzoNs IN CRmI:INoIXoGy 338 (2d ed. 1951).
9 ELLINGTON, PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN FROM CRIxMIAL CAREERs 43 (1948),
quoted in Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 3. CImi. L.,
C. & P.S. 347, 351 (1955).
10 OmSTED, FORHANDLINGER vED DEN NORSxE IKRmmALISTFORENINGS MOTE 42
(1935).
GENERAL PREVENTION
(1) ""Our knowledge of criminals shows us that the criminal law
has no deterrent effects."
The fallacy of this argument is obvious. If a man commits a
crime, we can only conclude that general prevention has not worked
in his case. If I interview a thousand prisoners, I collect information
about a thousand men in whose cases general prevention has failed.
But I cannot infer from this data that general prevention is ineffective
in the cases of all those who have not committed crimes. General
prevention is more concerned with the psychology of those obedient
to the law than with the psychology of criminals.
(2) "The belief in general prevention rests on an untenable
rationalistic theory of behavior."
It is true that the extreme theories of general prevention worked
out by people like Bentham and Feuerbach were based on a shallow
psychological model in which the actions of men were regarded as the
outcome of a rational choice whereby gains and losses were weighed
against each other. Similar simplified theories are sometimes ex-
pressed by police officials and by authors of letters to newspaper
editors asking for heavier penalties. But if we discard such theories,
it does not follow that we have to discard the idea of general pre-
vention. Just as fear enters the picture when people take a calculated
risk in committing an offense, fear may also be an element in behavior
which is not rationally motivated. As mentioned earlier, modern
theories of general prevention take into account both deterrence and
moral influence, and they concede that the effects involved may be
"unconscious and emotional, drawing upon deep rooted fears and
aspirations." ' This does not mean that one's general theory of
motivation is of no consequence in assessing the effect of general pre-
vention. The criminologist who believes that a great many people
walk about carrying an urge for punishment which may be satisfied
by committing crimes is likely to be more skeptical about the value
of penal threats than is another who believes that these cases are rare
exceptions. Similarly, a man who views human nature optimistically,
is less inclined to advocate repressive measures than a person who
believes that man is ruthless and egoistic by nature and kept in line
only by means of fear.
(3) "Legal history shows that general prevention has always
been overestimated."
It is true that in the course of history there have been contentions
about general prevention which seem fantastic today. There was a
11 TAvP, op. cit. =pra note 1, at 246.
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time when distinguished members of the House of Lords rose to warn
their countrymen that the security of property would be seriously en-
dangered if the administration of justice were weakened by abolition
of capital punishment for shoplifting of items having a value of five
shillings. 2 Even today, one might find people with exaggerated
conceptions of what can be accomplished by means of strong threats
of punishment. But the fact that the general preventive effects of
punishment might have been exaggerated does not disprove the
existence of such effects.
(4) ""Because people generally refrain from crimes on moral
grounds, threats of penalty have little influence."
The premise contains a large measure of truth, but it does not
justify the conclusion. Three comments are necessary. (a) Even if
people on the whole do not require the criminal law to keep them from
committing more serious offenses, this is not true for offenses which
are subject to little or no moral reprobation. (b) Even though moral
inhibitions today are adequate enough to prevent the bulk of the
population from committing serious crimes, it is a debatable question
whether this would continue for long if the hazards of punishment
were removed or drastically minimized. It is conceivable that only a
small number of people would fall victim to temptation when the
penalties were first abolished or greatly reduced, but that with the
passage of time, crime would attract the weaker souls who had become
demoralized by seeing offenses committed with impunity. The effects
might gradually spread through the population in a chain reaction.
(c) Even though it be conceded that law abiding conduct in certain
areas predominantly depends upon nonlegal conditions, this does not
mean that the effects of the legal machinery are not extremely valuable
from a community point of view. Let us imagine a fictitious city
which has a million adult male inhabitants who commit a hundred
rapes annually. Suppose, then, that abolishing the crime of rape led
to an increase in the number of rape cases to one thousand. From a
social psychological point of view one might conclude that the legal
measures were quite insignificant: 999,000 males do not commit rape
even when the threat of penalty is absent. If observed from the view
point of the legal machinery, however, the conclusion is entirely dif-
ferent. A catastrophic increase of serious cases of violence has oc-
curred. In other words, the increase in rape has demonstrated the
tremendous social importance of general prevention.
12
KOEsTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 30 (1957) (with extracts of the speech
of Chief Justice Ellenborough on May 30, 1810). See also 1 RADznqowicz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLisHE CRXiNAL LAW 231-59 (1948) (on "the doctrine of maximum
security").
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(5) "To believe in general prevention is to accept brutal
penalties."
This reasoning is apparent in Zilboorg's statement that "if it is
true that the punishment of the criminal must have a deterrent effect,
then the abolition of the drawing and quartering of criminals was
both a logical and penological mistake. Why make punishment milder
and thus diminish the deterrent effect of punishment ?" 13
Here we find a mixture of empirical and ethical issues. It was
never a principle of criminal justice that crime should be prevented at
all costs. Ethical and social considerations will always determine
which measures are considered "proper." As Ball has expressed it:
"[A] penalty may be quite effective as a deterrent, yet undesirable." 14
Even if it were possible to prove that cutting off thieves' hands would
effectively prevent theft, proposals for such practice would scarcely win
many adherents today. This paper, however, is primarily concerned
with the empirical questions.
IV. SOME BASIC OBSERVATIONS ABOUT GENERAL PREVENTION
There are other varieties of error about general prevention, but
the five types discussed are the basic ones. I shall now state in
greater detail some facts we must bear in mind when considering
general prevention. While most of these points seem fairly self
evident, they nevertheless are frequently overlooked.
(1) Differences between types of offenses. The effect of criminal
law on the motivation of individuals is likely to vary substantially,
depending on the character of the norm being protected. Criminal law
theory has for ages distinguished between actions which are immoral
in their own right, maa per se, and actions which are illegal merely
because they are prohibited by law, mala quia prohibita. Although
the boundaries between these two types of action are somewhat blurred,
the distinction is a fundamental one. In the case of mala per se, the
law supports the moral codes of society. If the threats of legal punish-
ment were removed, moral feelings and the fear of public judgment
would remain as powerful crime prevention forces, at least for a
limited period. In the case of mala quia prohibita, the law stands
alone; conformity is essentially a matter of effective legal sanctions.
But there are variations within each of these two main groups.
Let us take the ban on incest and the prohibition of the theft, as
examples. As a moral matter, the prohibition of incest is nearly
universal, but violations are not legally punishable everywhere. I
13 ZILOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRImINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 78
(1954).
14 Ball, supra note 9, at 352.
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doubt that the absence of a threat of punishment seriously influences
the number of cases of incest. The moral prohibition of incest is so
closely integrated with family structure that there is little need for the
support of the criminal law. Stealing, however, is an entirely different
matter. As Leslie Wilkins puts it: "The average normal housewife
does not need to be deterred from poisoning her husband, but possibly
does need a deterrent from shoplifting." " And what applies to stealing
applies even more to tax dodging. In this field, experience seems to
show that the majority of citizens are potential criminals. Generally
speaking, the more rational and normally motivated a specific violation
may appear, the greater the importance of criminal sanctions as a
means of sustaining lawfulness.
Any realistic discussion of general prevention must be based on
a distinction between various types of norms and on an analysis of
the circumstances motivating transgression in each particular type."0
This is a fact easily overlooked, and authors often discuss general
prevention as if all norms were the same. Probably they have certain
basic types of offenses in mind-for instance murder or property
violations-but they fail to make this limitation explicit.
(2) Differences between persons. Citizens are not equally re-
ceptive to the general preventive effects of the penal system. The
intellectual prerequisites to understanding and assessing the threat of
punishment may be deficient or totally absent. Children, the insane
and those suffering from mental deficiency are, for this reason, poor
objects of general prevention. In other cases, the emotional pre-
conditions are missing; some people more than others are slaves of
the desires and impulses of the moment, even when realizing that they
may have to pay dearly for their self-indulgence. In addition,
psychiatrists claim that some people have feelings of guilt and conse-
quent cravings for penance that lead them to commit crimes for the
purpose of bringing punishment upon themselves.
Just as intellectual and emotional defects reduce the deterrent
effects of punishment, they may also render an individual more or
less unsusceptible to the moral influences of the law. While most
members of the community will normally be inclined to accept the
provisions and prohibitions of the law, this attitude is not uniform.
Some people exhibit extreme opposition to authority either in the form
of indifference or overaggression and defiance.
'5 Wilkins, Criminology: An Operational Research Approach, in Socray-
PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF STUDY 322 (Welford ed. 1962).
18 See Andenaes, supra note 3, at 176-90. Six types of violations are dis-
cussed: Police offenses, economic crimes, property violations, moral offenses, murder
and political crimes.
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(3) Differences between societies. The criminal laws do not
operate in a cultural vacuum. Their functions and importance vary
radically according to the kind of society which they serve. In a
small, slowly changing community the informal social pressures are
strong enough to stimulate a large measure of conformity without the
aid of penal laws. In an expanding urbanized society with a large
degree of mobility this social control is weakened, and the mechanisms
of legal control assume a far more basic role.-'
Even in countries which have reached equivalent stages of
economic development, the cultural atmosphere may differ. After a
visit to the United States in the 1930's, two leading European crim-
inologists found that the American attitude toward the law was dif-
ferent from the attitude in the more tradition bound European societies.
The Austrian criminologist Grassberger spoke of the lack of a legal
conscience (Rechtsbewusstsein) in the European sense."8 The Swedish
psychiatrist Kinberg emphasized
the apparently slight influence exercised by the penal laws on
the public opinion of morals. The legislative mill grinds as
it does in European countries, but the average American cares
little what comes out of it. His own behavior-patterns are
but slightly affected by the fact that the penal law disapproves
of a certain behavior-pattern, but so much the more by the
opinion of his own social group, i.e., the people with whom
his psychological relations are more or less personal, e.g., his
family, friends, fellow workers, acquaintances, clubs, etc.'"
(4) Conflicting group norms. The motivating influences of the
penal law may become more or less neutralized by group norms work-
ing in the opposite direction. The group may be a religious organiza-
tion which opposes compulsory military service, or it may be a criminal
gang acting for the sake of profit. It may be organized labor fighting
against strike legislation which they regard as unjust, or it may be a
prohibited political party that wants to reform the entire social and
political order of the day. It may be a subjugated minority using
every means available in its struggle for equality, or the dominating
17 Military forces waging war in enemy territories might be regarded as con-
stituting separate societies in which the pressure toward violations of law and the
pressure toward conformity are both especially powerful. "There have been armies
having no disciplinary punishments, no dungeons or execution platoons," says Tarde;
"in every instance they soon became a horde." TAsDE, PENAL PHmLOSOPHY 480
(1912). The statement may contain some exaggeration, but there is a substantial
measure of truth in it. In occupation armies characterized by strict discipline, as
for example the German army in Norway during World War II, plunder and rape
are practically unknown, while such encroachments may assume great proportions
when the discipline is weak. See RussELL, THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKxA 132-33
(1959).
18 GRASSBERGER, GEWNERBS-UND BERUFSVERDRECHERTUM IN DEN VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN voN AmImKA 299 (1933).
19 K RG, op. cit. supra note 3, at 168-69.
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group of society which employs every means available to prevent the
minority from enjoying in practice the equality it is promised in law.
Or perhaps it may be an ethnic or social group whose traditional pat-
terns of living clash with the laws of society.
In such cases, the result is a conflict between the formalized com-
munity laws, which are expressed through the criminal law, and the
counteracting norms dominating the group. Against the moral effects
of the penal law stands the moral influence of the group; against the
fear of legal sanction stands the fear of group sanction, which may
range from the loss of social status to economic boycott, violence and
even homicide.
(5) Law obedience in law enforcement agencies. The question
of general prevention is normally treated as a matter of the private
citizen's obedience of the law. However, a similar question may be
raised about law enforcement agencies. All countries have outlawed
corruption and neglect of duty within the police and the civil service,
but in many places they are serious problems. In all probability, there
are few areas in which the crime rates differ so much from country to
country. Laxity and corruption in law enforcement in its turn is
bound to reduce the general preventive effects of criminal law.
V. VARIATIONS IN GENERAL PREVENTION WITH CHANGES IN
LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
It is a matter of basic interest, from a practical point of view, to
determine how general prevention varies according to changes in
legislation or legal machinery. Such changes may be classified into
four different categories.
(1) The Risk of Detection, Apprehension and Conviction. The
efficiency of the system could be changed, for example, by intensifying
or reducing the effort of the police or by altering the rules of criminal
procedure so as to increase or lower the probabilities that criminals will
escape punishment. Even the simplest kind of common sense indicates
that the degree of risk of detection and conviction is of paramount im-
portance to the preventive effects of the penal law. Very few people
would violate the law if there were a policeman on every doorstep. It has
even been suggested that the insanity of an offender be determined by
asking whether he would have performed the prohibited act "with a
policeman at his elbow." 20
Exceptions would occur, however. Some crimes are committed
in such a state of excitement that the criminal acts without regard to
the consequences. In other cases the actor accepts the penalty as a
20 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment at 158, appendix C at 184 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
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reasonable price for carrying out the action-we may think of the
attitude a busy salesman has toward parking regulations. Further a
political assassin may deliberately sacrifice his life to his cause. But
there is good reason to believe that certainty of rapid apprehension and
punishment would prevent most violations. 1
On the other hand there is evidence that the lack of enforcement
of penal laws designed to regulate behavior in morally neutral fields
may rapidly lead to mass infringements. Parking regulations, cur-
rency regulations and price regulations are examples of such laws'
The individual's moral reluctance to break the law is not strong enough
to secure obedience when the law comes into conflict with his personal
interests.
There is an interesting interplay between moral reprobation and
legal implementation. At least three conditions combine to prevent an
individual from perpetrating a punishable act he is tempted to perform:
his moral inhibitions, his fear of the censure of his associates and his
fear of punishment. The latter two elements are interwoven in many
ways. A law violation may become known to the criminal's family,
friends and neighbors even if there is no arrest or prosecution. How-
ever, it is frequently the process of arrest, prosecution and trial which
brings the affair into the open and exposes the criminal to the censure
of his associates. If the criminal can be sure that there will be no
police action, he can generally rest assured that there will be no social
reprobation. The legal machinery, therefore, is in itself the most
effective means of mobilizing that kind of social control which
emanates from community condemnation.
Reports on conditions of disorganization following wars, revolu-
tions or mutinies provide ample documentation as to how lawlessness
may flourish when the probability of detection, apprehension and con-
viction is low.' In these situations, however, many factors work
together. The most clear cut examples of the importance of the risk
of detection itself are provided by cases in which society functions
normally but all policing activity is paralyzed by a police strike or a
similar condition. For example, the following official report was made
on lawlessness during a 1919 police strike, starting at midnight on July
31st, during which nearly half of the Liverpool policemen were out
of service:
In this district the strike was "accompanied by threats, violence
and intimidation on the part of lawless persons. Many
21 The time element is important. Threats of punishment in the distant future
are not as a rule as important in the process of motivation as are threats of imme-
diate punishment.
2 See Andenaes, supra note 3, at 182-86.
29 See KmaERG, op. cit. supra note 3, ch. VI.
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assaults on the constables who remained on duty were com-
mitted. Owing to the sudden nature of the strike the au-
thorities were afforded no opportunity to make adequate
provision to cope with the position. Looting of shops com-
menced about 10 p.m. on August 1st, and continued for some
days. In all about 400 shops were looted. Military were
requisitioned, special constables sworn in, and police brought
from other centers.2"
A somewhat similar situation occurred in Denmark when the
German occupation forces arrested the entire police force in September,
1944. During the remainder of the occupation period all policing was
performed by an improvised unarmed watch corps, who were in-
effective except in those instances when they were able to capture the
criminal red handed. The general crime rate rose immediately, but
there was a great discrepancy between the various types of crime.25
The number of cases of robbery increased generally in Copenhagen dur-
ing the war, rising from ten per year in 1939 to ten per month in
1943. But after the Germans arrested the police in 1944, the figure
rose to over a hundred per month and continued to rise. Larcenies
reported to the insurance companies quickly increased tenfold and
more. The fact that penalties were greatly increased for criminals who
were caught and brought before the courts did not offset the fact that
most crimes were going undetected. On the other hand, crimes like
embezzlement and fraud, where the criminal is usually known if the
crime itself is discovered, do not seem to have increased notably.
Unfortunately none of these reports tells us whether the rise in
criminality was due to increased activity among established criminals
or whether noncriminals participated as well. Kinberg, basing his
observations on studies of the French Revolution and other political
upheavals, holds that the rate increases primarily because existing
criminal and asocial elements take advantage of the unusual circum-
stances, but that men who were "potential criminals" before the crisis
also make a contribution.
The involuntary experiments in Liverpool and Copenhagen
showed a reduction in law obedience following a reduction of risks.
Examples of the opposite are also reported-the number of crimes
decreases as the hazards rise. Tarde mentions that the number of
cases of poisoning decreased when research in chemistry and toxicology
made it possible to discover with greater certainty the causes as well
as the perpetrator of this type of crime." A decline in bank robberies
2 4 MANNHEIM, SocrAL ASPECTS OF CRIME IN ENGLAND BETWEEN THE WARS
156-57 (1940).
2 5
TROLLE, SYV MAANEDER UDEN POLITI (1945).
26 TADE, PEAL PHmosoPHY 476 (1912).
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and kidnappings in the United States is reported to have followed
the enactment of federal legislation which increased the likelihood of
punishment.
2 7
A Swedish postwar experience is also worth noting. In order to
save gasoline during the Suez crisis of 1956, Sweden prohibited the
driving of private automobiles on weekends. While special permission
to drive could be obtained (the necessary permit had to be affixed to
the windshield of the car), most cars were immobilized. This pro-
hibition, of course, greatly increased the risks involved in stealing cars
on weekends. A considerable decrease in the number of automobile
thefts is said to have occurred on Saturdays and Sundays during the
period of prohibition, especially in the larger cities.2 It appears that
even such a youthful and unstable group as the automobile thieves in
the Scandinavian countries-mostly "joyriders"-reacts to an in-
creased risk when the increase is tangible enough.
The decisive factor in creating the deterrent effect is, of course,
not the objective risk of detection but the risk as it is calculated by the
potential criminal. We know little about how realistic these cal-
culations are. It is often said that criminals tend to be overly
optimistic-they are confident that all will work out well. It is possible
that the reverse occurs among many law abiding people; they are
deterred because of an over-estimation of the risks. A faulty estimate
in one direction or the other may consequently play an important part
in determining whether an individual is to become a criminal. If
fluctuations in the risks of detection do not reach the potential offender,
they can be of no consequence to deterrence. If, on the other hand,
it were possible to convince people that crime does not pay, this
assumption might act as a deterrent even if the risks, viewed ob-
jectively, remained unchanged.
Popular notions regarding the risks of convictions are also likely
to have a bearing on the moral effects of the criminal law. The law's
moral influence on the citizen is likely to be weakened if the law can
be violated with impunity. The law abiding citizen who has subdued
his anti-social inclinations might become frustrated when he observes
others follow their desires without experiencing disagreeable conse-
quences. He will not be able to confirm that his sacrifice was worth-
while.1 Violations unknown to him, of course, will not produce
similar results.
2 7 
TAT, CR=NOLOGY 322, 361 (rev. ed. 1950) ; Ball, supra note 9, at 350 n.1l.
See also Sellin, L'Effet Intimidant de la Peine, [1958] REVUE DE SCIENCE CImINELLE
r DE DROIT PANAL COmIPARt 579, 590 (1960), concerning an experiment of the
New York police in 1954.
28 1958 SOCIALA MEDDELA-DEN 329-30.
29 See Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. Cm. L., C. & P.S. 332, 333-34
(1964).
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However, for some types of crime even an occasional enforcement
of the law may bring about considerable preventive effects. Criminal
abortion convictions in most countries seem to be very rare in relation
to the real crime rate. In Norway, a Public Law Committee in 1956
estimated that the annual number of illegal abortions was approximately
7,000.o During the preceding five years, on the average only twenty
persons a year were found guilty of this offense. The situation in
many other countries is much the same.3 1 In spite of such infrequent
law enforcement, however, most people who have given attention to
the problem are convinced that a removal of the penal threat will lead
to a decisive rise in the number of abortions. I do not believe that
the threat of punishment has much deterrent effect on the women who
desire abortion, but it makes it more difficult for them to find a doctor
(or a quack) willing to perform the operation; moreover, the legal
prohibition may influence the general attitude toward abortion. The
Soviet experiment lends support to this position. To counteract quack
abortions, the doors of the state hospitals were in 1920 opened for
free interruptions of pregnancy. By 1930, the number of registered
abortions in Leningrad and Moscow was one and one-half times as
high as the number of births and still quack abortions had not dis-
appeared.3 In other countries of Eastern Europe and in Japan, the
legalization or liberalization of abortion after World War II has been
followed by an enormous rise in the number of abortions.s3
(2) The Severity of Penalties. At least since the time of Beccaria,
it has been commonly accepted that the certainty of detection and
punishment is of greater consequence in deterring people from com-
mitting crimes than is the severity of the penalty. This notion has
undoubtedly contributed significantly to the abolition of brutal penalties,
and there is certainly a large measure of truth in it. Part of the
explanation is that one who ponders the possibility of detection and
punishment before committing a crime must necessarily consider the
total social consequences, of which the penalty is but a part. A trusted
cashier committing embezzlement, a minister who evades payment of
his taxes, a teacher making sexual advances towards minors and a
civil servant who accepts bribes have a fear of detection which is more
closely linked with the dread of public scandal and subsequent social
ruin than with apprehensions of legal punishment. Whether the
80 INNSTILLING FRA STRAVELovRAADET Om ADGANGEN TML AA AvBRYnE SVANGER-
sxAp 26 (1956).
81 See, e.g., G. WILIAMs, THE SANCTITY op LrFE AND THE CPIMNAL LAw
209-12 (1957).32 d. at 213-20.
33 See id. at 236; 2 EXCERPTA CRImINOLOGICA 73 (1962). See also MEHLAN,
1NTERw4TIONNAT.E AoRTSITUATION (1961).
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punishment is severe or mild thus appears to be rather unimportant.
However, in cases of habitual criminals or juvenile delinquents from
the slums the situation may be quite different.
Even if we accept Beccaria's position, it does not follow that the
severity of penalties is without importance. It is difficult to increase
the likelihood of detection and punishment because the risk of detection
usually depends on many conditions beyond the reach of the authorities,
and because improvement of police effectiveness requires money and
human resources. Accordingly, when the legislators and courts attempt
to check any apparent rise in the crime rate they generally increase the
severity of penalties. On the other hand, for those who wish to make
the criminal law more humane the problem is one of determining how
far it is possible to proceed in the direction of leniency without weaken-
ing the law's total preventive effects. It is impossible to avoid the
question of how important a change in the severity of the punishment
may be under standard conditions of detection, apprehension and
conviction. For the judge this is the only form in which the problem
presents itself.
A potential criminal who reflects upon the possibilities of punish-
ment may pay attention to the severity of the penalty to which he
exposes himself, as well as to the risks of detection. He may be willing
to run the risk of a year's imprisonment but he might not gamble ten.
The situation is similar to those in which nature herself attaches
penalties to certain actions. Sexual promiscuity has always brought
with it the risk of undesired children and of venereal diseases, and
consideration of these risks has certainly in the course of time per-
suaded many people to exercise self-restraint. The progress of civiliza-
tion has lead to a diminishing of the former risk and rendered the
latter less formidable. Few people will deny that these changes have
had a considerable bearing on the development of sexual mores in the
Western world.
One weakness in the mechanism of deterrence is the fact that
threats of future punishment, especially if apprehension is uncertain,
do not have the same motivating power as the desires of the moment.
While some people live in a state of perpetual anxiety and concern for
the future, others focus only on the present. There have always been
people who have been willing to risk eternal pain as the price of satisfy-
ing worldly desires in this life. Moreover, when the risks of detection
are considered small, it is possible that questions about the severity of
the penalty tend to lose their significance. As we indicated earlier,
the criminal often acts upon the assumption that all is going to end
well; what might take place if he is caught is pushed into the back-
ground. It is also possible, of course, that the very severity of the
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penalty-the magnitude of the risk-may give the illegal action a
special appeal, in the way that dangerous sports are attractive to some
people.
Other factors may also enter the picture. A professional criminal
may be so strongly involved in his profession that he feels there are no
real alternatives regardless of the penalties. The newspapers recently
reported the activities of an eighty-seven year old Greek pick-pocket
who was once more facing the court. He had fifty previous convic-
tions, and had spent some fifty years behind prison walls in Greece or
abroad. He was released from prison by amnesty on the occasion
of King Constantine's wedding, but a few weeks later he was caught
in the act of taking money from a man in an elevator. In the face of
such a set pattern of life, the threat of punishment is simply ineffective.
Even more complicated than the connection between the magni-
tude of the penalty and its deterrent effect is the connection between
the magnitude of the penalty and its moral effect. Heavy penalties are
an expression of strong social condemnation, and prima facie one
might assume that the heavier the penalty the greater its moral effect.
However, it is not that simple. In fact, we are concerned here with
two problems. One problem is that of determining the impact of
stronger or lesser severity of the entire penal system. In the
Scandinavian countries, sentences are on the whole much more lenient
than in the United States. A penalty of three years imprisonment in
Norway marks the crime as very grave, quite unlike the situation in
the United States. Perhaps what takes place is an adjustment between
the penalties employed and their evaluation by the public, so that social
disapproval may be both expressed and graded almost as efficiently by
means of lenient sentences as by severe ones. The second problem is
that of determining the impact of stronger or milder penalties for
certain types of offenses. Is it possible to use legislation and court
practice as devices to influence where, on their scale of condemnation,
citizens are to place different types of violations? Stephen seemed to
have extreme confidence in the power of legislation when he said: "The
sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to
any offence what a seal is to hot wax." 3 4 But it might be maintained
with equal justification that while the law certainly serves to strengthen
the moral inhibitions against crime in general, it is not very successful
in pressing upon the public its own evaluation of various types of
conduct. Experience, at least, seems to show that old laws which run
counter to new ideas have a tendency to fade out of use and, eventually,
to be repealed. A recent paper by Walker and Argyle gives some
4 2 STFPHExN, THE HISTORY OF THE CmmIxAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883).
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support to the notion that mere knowledge that a form of conduct is
a criminal offense has little bearing on the moral attitude of individuals
toward that conduct.3 5
Questions about the importance of punishment have been dis-
cussed in great detail with reference to whether capital punishment
for murder is conducive to greater preventive effects than life imprison-
ment. Comparisons between states employing capital punishment and
states which have abolished it, as well as comparisons of the frequency
of murder before and after abolition, reveal no stable correlations and
have led most criminologists to conclude that capital punishment is of
little or no consequence. The lack of correlation is understandable
from a psychological point of view. In the first place, murder in our
culture is surrounded by massive moral reprobation. Accordingly, the
inhibitions against murder usually are broken only in situations of
emotional excitement or intense pressure in which the criminal dis-
regards the consequences. Secondly, if the potential criminal de-
liberates about the risk of punishment before he takes action, then
both the death penalty and life imprisonment will appear so drastic
that the difference between them may seem fairly insignificant. He
relies on going undetected; if he is detected, he has lost.
The moral effects of capital punishment also must be considered.
It may be said that capital punishment for murder exerts a moral
influence by indicating that life is the most highly protected value.
Perhaps this is what Stephen was expressing in his famous words:
"Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if
they committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands
abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason
why they regard it with horror is, that murderers are hung with the
hearty approbation of all reasonable men." " But it is worth noting
that we find here a discrepancy between aims and means which is
likely to weaken the moral effect of capital punishment. The law
attempts to impress upon society a respect for human life as an
absolute value while, at the same time, this respect is disregarded by
employing the death penalty to punish the offender.
It would, however, be incorrect to conclude, on the basis of
existing evidence, that the death penalty is always ineffective. In his
book on terrorism and communism, Trotsky points out that after a
revolution the deposed party fighting to regain power cannot become
frightened by threats of imprisonment because no one believes in the
permanence of the new regime. The death penalty by contrast retains
95 Walker & Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgment, 4 BRrris J. CRm1.
570 (1964).
a
6 STuEHEN, A GENEAL VxEW OF THE CRImINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863).
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its deterrent effect-"the revolution kills a few and intimidates the
thousands.""aT Experiences in my own country during the German
occupation in the Second World War give rise to similar observations.
To work against the occupants was considered by the great majority
of the people to be nationally and morally just. To be arrested for
illegal activities therefore brought about no loss of social esteem. On
the contrary, the victims of the Gestapo were regarded by the popula-
tion with affection and admiration. During the last part of the war,
when the population counted the continuation of the occupation by
months or weeks, even the threat of life imprisonment meant no more
than the risk of transitory detention. In such a context, the threat of
capital punishment produced a thoroughly different and more frighten-
ing effect than the notion of arrest and imprisonment. Experience
during the occupation of Norway also shows how the risk of punish-
ment might produce different results according to the national attitude
of the individual and his receptiveness to danger. A large share of
the population wanted to run no risks. Although sympathetic to the
resistance movement, it would not become involved. Another large
share of the public was willing to take part in resistance activities as
long as the dangers were limited and their lives would not be in
peril. Members of a third group would not allow themselvesto be
intimidated by notions of either death or torture.
It is unfortunate that discussions of general prevention have
concentrated on the effects of capital punishment for murder. In
most societies, murder is a rare crime which attracts a disproportionate
amount of attention. At least in the Scandinavian countries, the
victims of murder are very few in comparison with the victims
of careless automobile driving, but for emotional reasons murder
is more interesting than traffic deaths. Even in an emotional
crime like murder, with all its pathological elements, it would
be untenable to claim that the magnitude of the punishment has
no effect whatsoever. If punishment of three or four years'
imprisonment became the standard sentence for murder, the risk con-
nected with murder done for the sake of profit would diminish and
this kind of crime would probably increase. In the long run such a
reduction in penalty might also reduce the inhibitions against com-
mitting murder in situations where murder seems a tempting escape
from a situation of emotional conflict.
Interesting lessons may be drawn from an experiment launched
in some of the Scandinavian countries to fight drunken driving. In
Norway, for example, the motor vehicle code prohibits driving of motor
87 TROTSKY, TERRoRismE T Commums m 68 (1920).
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vehicles when the alcohol percentage in the driver's blood exceeds
0.05, a percentage which in clinical examinations would rarely pro-
duce behavioral changes significant enough to allow the drawing of
uncontestable conclusions about a state of drunkenness or intoxication.
A driver who is suspected of violating the provision must consent to
a blood test, and it is not necessary to prove that the driver was unfit
to drive because of his consumption of alcohol, so there is only very
rarely any question of proof. And the consistent policy of the courts
has been to give prison sentences for violations, except in cases involv-
ing very exceptional circumstances. The prison terms are short,
usually not much more than the minimum jail period of twenty-one
days, but the penalty is exacted on anyone who is detected, whether
or not the driving was dangerous or caused damage.
A person moving between Norway and the United States can
hardly avoid noticing the radical difference in the attitudes towards
automobile driving and alcohol. There is no reason to doubt that the
difference in legal provisions plays a substantial role in this difference
in attitudes. The awareness of hazards of imprisonment for intoxi-
cated driving is in our country a living reality to every driver, and
for most people the risk seems too great. When a man goes to a
party where alcoholic drinks are likely to be served, and if he is not
fortunate enough to have a wife who drives but does not drink,
he will leave his car at home or he will limit his consumption to a
minimum. It is also my feeling-although I am here on uncertain
grounds-that the legislation has been instrumental in forming or
sustaining the widespread conviction that it is wrong, or irresponsible,
to place oneself behind the wheel when intoxicated. "Alcohol and
motor car driving do not belong together" is a slogan commonly
accepted. Statistics on traffic accidents show a very small number of
accidents due to intoxication. 39
It should not be concluded that there is anything like absolute
obedience to the laws regulating drunken driving. Every year a con-
siderable number of people are convicted for violations, and the
number has risen in proportion to the increase in the number of
automobiles. In recent years, more persons have been sentenced to
imprisonment for this misdemeanor than for all felonies put together.
And there are, of course, .a large number of citizens whose violations
of the law go undetected because neither their management of the
3 8 
NORWEGIAN MoToR VEHICLE CODE 0r 1926, § 17.
39 See ANDENAEs & HAUGE, UAKTsoMT DAP i DE NoRDlxSn LAND 78-79 (1966);
Schram, Trafikkulykker og Alkohol, 1954 MOTORTmIDNDE 10-15. Of 7,967 traffic acci-
dents in 1951, the driver was under the influence of alcohol (more than 0.05%
alcohol in the blood) in 114 cases. Of 194 fatal accidents, the driver was under the
influence of alcohol in ten. In 1960 the figures were 310 and eleven respectively.
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car nor their general behavior arouses suspicion. Interviews with
students have revealed considerable hidden criminality even in this
field. But the fact that violations occur does not interfere with our
conclusion that the severity of the legislation has to a very high degree
limited the incidence of driving after drinking.
It seems reasonable to conclude that as a general rule, though not
without exceptions, the general preventive effect of the criminal law
increases with the growing severity of penalties. Contemporary dic-
tatorships display with almost frightening clarity the conformity that
can be produced by a ruthlessly severe justice.
However, it is necessary to make two important reservations. In
the first place, as we indicated when discussing the risk of detection,
what is decisive is not the actual practice but how this practice is
conceived by the public. Although little research has been done to
find out how much the general public knows about the penal system,
presumably most people have only vague and unspecified notions.
Therefore, only quite substantial changes will be noticed. Only rarely
does a single sentence bring about significant preventive effects.
In the second place, the prerequisite of general prevention is that
the law be enforced. Experience seems to show that excessively severe
penalties may actually reduce the risk of conviction, thereby leading
to results contrary to their purpose. When the penalties are not
reasonably attuned to the gravity of the violation, the public is less
inclined to inform the police, the prosecuting authorities are less dis-
posed to prosecute and juries are less apt to convict. Beutel has
provided an excellent illustration of this in his study of the severe bad
check laws in Nebraska. He concludes his examination of the policy
of county attorneys and sheriffs as follows: "In all, the Nebraska pic-
ture is one of spotty performance by law enforcement officials, varying
all the way from those who are frustrated by the enormity of enforcing
the laws as written and consequently do nothing or as little as possible
to those who try to enforce the statute literally but usually fail at
re-election." o By comparison, he found that bad checks were rarer
in Colorado, where the law was milder but enforcement was more
uniform and effective.4"
(3) Punishment or Treatment. There is ample reason to believe
that the general preventive effects of punishment are connected with
the main features of the penal system. For example, minor revisions
of the rules about mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the met-
ing out of punishment cannot easily be imagined as having demon-
strable effects as long as fundamental changes in the direction of miti-
40 BEUTEI, EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE 366 (1957).
41 Ibid.
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gation or aggravation are not being introduced. From a practical
point of view this means that considerations of individual prevention
could be taken into account to a considerable degree without noticeably
impairing the general preventive effects.
But it may well be asked what would happen if the existing penal
system were abolished in favor of a purely treatment oriented system.
This approach would be similar to the method currently used for
children, the insane and mentally defective-incarceration is employed
only to the extent deemed necessary in view of the problems of par-
ticular individuals, and any loss of liberty accompanying the incarcera-
tion is not intended as punishment.
To begin with, it is evident that even measures which are "pure
treatment" may convey a deterrent influence similar to that of regular
punishment. For example, a treatment program aimed at remodeling
the criminal's personality and norm system often presupposes insti-
tutional treatment over a longer period than is necessary if the criminal
is merely being punished. But from the point of view of general
prevention the problem lies at the other end of the scale-in cases
where the individual offender requires little or no treatment. This
relates to one aspect of the problem which we touched on previously,
namely how far it is possible to proceed in the direction of leniency
without significantly reducing the preventive effects of the criminal
law.,
It is hardly worthwhile to proceed further into discussions of the
relationships of treatment and general prevention at this time. It is
difficult to imagine what a purely treatment system might be. We
know as yet very little about what kinds of treatment are most suitable
for what kinds of criminals and even less about how, or whether, the
rate of success varies according to the duration and intensity. Systems
based on the treatment ideology could conceivably take forms which are
utterly dissimilar from the point of view of general prevention. What
appears realistic today is the application of treatment programs to
limited categories of criminals. Discussions of treatment and general
prevention must therefore take place in connection with such limited
problems. For many categories of offenses a system of treatment does
not seem to be at all a real alternative to the existing repressive system.
Such offenses are, for example, espionage, careless driving, tax dodg-
ing, corruption among civil servants, violations of laws involving
4 2 It has been contended that only a system of penalties representing just refribu-
tion will exert the desired influence on public morals. See the authorities referred
to in ANDENAES, TEE GENERAL PART OF THE C.ImiNAL LAW OF NORWAY 64 n.12
(1965). Just retribution, according to this school of thought, is not the goal of
punishment; it is the means which, socio-psychologically spealdng, is most effective
in securing obedience. Such general hypotheses are difficult to validate or negate.
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economic regulation and all those similar prescriptions of order char-
acterizing modern societies. In such cases, it is apparent to even the
strongest believers in a treatment ideology that the basic function of
the intervention of society is to create respect for social norms, not to
cure individuals of their asocial inclinations.
(4) Restriction or Expansion of the Penal System. It may be
interesting to speculate on what effects would occur if the entire penal
system-the criminal law, the police, the courts, the prisons-were
removed and no other apparatus of legal sanction substituted for it.
According to Marxist ideology, this condition will be attained when
the final Communist society has been established. The theory assumes
that everyone will perform his duty willingly and habitually so that
it will not be necessary to use punishment or other means of coercion,
and consequently the state will wither away. But as we look at the
actual developments within Communist countries we see no obvious
signs that the state is withering away or that the police or punishment
have been eliminated. Nearly half a century after the Russian Revolu-
tion, we find capital punishment used in the Soviet Union not only
for treason but for economic crimes as well.
There may be fields where a sufficient degree of conformity could
be reached without any sanction, by appealing to the citizens and
making it easy for them to conform. But it does not seem probable
that such techniques will be widely applicable. If it is felt necessary
to interfere through legislation, it will normally also be felt necessary
to put a sanction behind the rules. A threat of punishment is the
traditional means of enforcement. Perhaps greater imagination should
be used to develop alternatives to punishment.
It seems fairly safe to predict that no society will experiment in
these matters to the extent of abolishing the basic penal provisions
protecting life, bodily safety or property. The involuntary experiments
created by police strikes or similar conditions support the notion that
a highly urbanized industrial society can scarcely exist without
police and criminal courts or a state power apparatus with similar
functions. However, outside the basic areas protected by the criminal
law the direction is much less certain. The regulation of economic
activities through the use of criminal sanctions has varied from country
to country. Religious offenses constitute another field in which there
have been great fluctuations in the penal approach. Similarly, there
currently is a great degree of uncertainty concerning the legal treat-
ment of many activities rooted in or related to sex, such as prostitution,
homosexuality, crimen bestialitatis and pornography. Abortion con-
stitutes still another category which is subject to differing legal evalua-
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tions. Political crimes also deserve to be mentioned. In some
countries there is nearly boundless freedom for verbal attacks on the
government and the prevailing social order, while in others any kind
of criticism is considered a dangerous crime against the state.
Just an enumeration of some of these categories of crimes conveys
the hopelessness of treating them as a single unit. Any discussion of
the possibility-and desirability---of making citizens conform by means
of the penal law must treat each category separately, and it must be
based on detailed information about the activity being discussed.
"Motivation" and "detection risks" are necessary key words in such a
discussion. Prohibition laws in the United States and in some Euro-
pean countries after World War I are horrendous examples of mis-
calculation on the part of legislators. The experiments illustrate how
difficult it is to evoke respect for penal provisions regarded by the
bulk of the population as an undue interference with their freedom.
VI. RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES ON THE EFFICACY OF
GENERAL PREVENTION
When for practical reasons it is necessary to estimate the general
preventive effects of some specific alternative as opposed to another,
the estimate is usually made by means of common psychological
reasoning. For example, on the basis of rather cloudy notions of
human nature and social conditions, law committees and judges some-
times try to predict how a certain innovation is likely to function in
a particular situation in a given society. The more realistic the
psychology applied, and the more thorough the knowledge about the
activity concerned, the more probable it is that an estimate is some-
where near the truth.
It is now fashionable to hold that we have no knowledge whatever
about general prevention. As should be apparent from the preceding
material, I believe this to be a considerable exaggeration. In fact, it
may well be maintained that we have more knowledge, at least more
useful knowledge, about the general preventive effects of punishment
than about special preventive effects. A generation ago, prison au-
thorities and psychiatrists believed they knew a good deal about how
to treat criminals. Recent research, especially that conducted in
England and California on the comparative effects of various sanctions,
seems to show that, on the whole, these notions were illusions. 43 This
research suggests that there is little difference between the overall
results of various kinds of treatment when consideration is given to
differences in the composition of the population being treated. Pro-
4 3 For a first rate and up to date survey, see HooD, RESEARCH ON THE EFEC-
TIVENESS OF PUNISHMENTS AND TREATMENTS (Report to the European Council No.
DPC/CDIR 9, 1964).
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bation shows almost the same results as institutional treatment; a
short period of treatment about the same results as long one; tradi-
tional disciplinary institutional treatment on the whole appears to
have results similar to those produced by treatment in modem, thera-
peutically-oriented institutions. It may be that overall success rates
are improper measures of the effects of different treatments, because
one type of treatment may be effective with one type of offender and
not with another. The attempts to work out a typology with which
to verify such an hypothesis have not gone beyond the "pilot study"
stage. The present state of knowledge does not provide adequate
grounds for erecting a penal system based on special preventive points
of view.
Continuing research on treatment is necessary. No less important,
however, is research designed to shed more light on questions of
general prevention. From time to time it is held that there is no
scientific method of research into general prevention. This, in my
opinion, is unwarranted defeatism. The problems are difficult, espe-
cially in relation to the long range moral effects of the criminal law, but
scarcely more difficult than many other problems dealt with in
sociological or social psychological research. Let us examine the
methods at our disposal.
(1) Comparisons between geographic areas. This method has
been employed in discussions of the effects of capital punishment.
Areas using the death penalty for murder are compared to areas where
there is no death penalty for this crime, with a view to determining
whether there is any connection between the punishment and the murder
rates. The method certainly has its difficulties. Statistics show only
the criminality which has been detected, and it is difficult to obtain
full knowledge of the factors which may influence the ratio of un-
detected crime. Even if the comparative method reveals a real differ-
ence in the extent of criminality, we still must judge whether the
difference is due to the penal system or to other social conditions. In
order to draw definite conclusions we need areas with similar social
conditions but drastic differences in legal systems, and such areas are
difficult to find. Systems of penal sanctions are usually quite similar
in countries which are close to each other in the fields of economic
and cultural development. If certain behavior is punishable in one
country but not in another, we may face an additional difficulty arising
from the fact that in the second country the behavior not regarded as
criminal will ordinarily not be investigated or registered.
In certain areas, however, there is hope for fruitful comparisons.
By and large, these are fields where sources other than police or court
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statistics can be utilized to measure the occurrence of a specific type
of deviance. Abortion was mentioned previously as a field in which
comparisons between differing areas may be both possible and valuable.
Beutel compared the operation of Nebraska's bad check laws with the
operation of similar laws in Colorado, Vermont and New Hampshire."
Information about the number and extent of bad checks was supplied
by banks, and information about financial losses for bad checks in
various types of businesses was obtained by means of questionnaires.
Intoxication among drivers is another field in which it should
be possible to carry out sound geographic comparisons. In this field
we find great divergences concerning legislation and legal practice.
At the same time the effects of legislation could be studied by using a
variety of techniques, for example, by conducting alcohol tests of
randomly selected motor car drivers, by interviews or by means of
alcohol tests on deceased traffic victims. Many practical and methodo-
logical difficulties must be overcome, but I am confident that by ex-
pending a reasonable amount of labor and money it will be possible
to reach results of great relevance to the solution of a serious social
problem in the motor age.
(2) Comparisons in time. When revisions are made in penal
provisions, in the organization of the police and in the practice of the
prosecuting authorities or of the courts, the extent of criminality can
be examined with a view to assessing the changes. The difficulties
here are similar to those encountered when making geographical com-
parisons. Radical and sudden changes in legal systems and the ma-
chinery of justice are rare. As a rule, change takes place through
gradual alterations, for example, in the direction of stronger or milder
penalties or in the degree of police effectiveness. As these alterations
occur, there are changes in other fields bearing upon criminality, and
it is extremely difficult to isolate each factor in order to determine
what produced the final result. Changes introduced into the system
may further influence the registration of crimes, so that the statistics
are not comparable.' This difficulty is compounded when new penal
provisions are introduced or old ones abolished, because generally
only violations are recorded-we do not keep records of non-
conformity before it becomes a crime or after it ceases to be a crime.
Such statistical problems may, however, be overcome in areas where
there are objective data on the extent of the nonconformity.
44 BEvrEL, op. cit. supra note 40, at 366.
45 A strong increase in policing activities may, at least temporarily, lead to an
increase in the number of convictions and perhaps in the number of reports to the
police as well.
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Drastic changes in law enforcement often take place during wars
or revolutions, but so many other conditions change simultaneously
that it is difficult to draw valid conclusions which apply to normal
conditions. The most advantageous basis for conclusions about causal
connections is found when great and sudden changes take place in law
enforcement while the life of the community proceeds in its normal
groove. The police strike, from the point of view of the social scientist,
is an ideal situation, but unfortunately for the scientist, society does not
permit the strike to continue long enough for exhaustive study.
In spite of the difficulties involved, the method of comparisons in
time should not be underestimated. Most of what we know about
general prevention comes from what history can tell us. Tarde pre-
sented a vast amount of material from various countries and periods,46
while Kinberg concentrated on revolutions and similar conditions.",
Radzinowicz has provided much material on the importance of a well-
organized and effective police." I am sure that a great deal more could
become known through systematic exploitation of historical materials.
Unfortunately, criminologists ordinarily are not historians, and
historians are rarely inclined to concentrate on problems of general
prevention.
Even better than to study the past is to watch the changes as they
are taking place. This method was employed by Moore and Callahan
in their well known study of public reactions to changes in parking
regulations, a study more remarkable for its methods and its
theoretical basis than for its results.49 Just as new types of penal
institutions should not be introduced unless opportunities are provided
for research on the effects of the new measures, important changes in
the law or in legal practice should always be correlated with a program
of research designed to examine the effects on crime as a whole. The
research does not have to be limited to the public legal machinery.
Large enterprises producing or marketing easily and widely consumed
goods such as tobacco and alcohol have the everlasting problem of
preventing theft among their own employees. They have their own
system of controls and their own means of sanction. Perhaps research
in this area will shed light on how the ordinary citizen resists the
temptation to steal and also will show how employees react to changes
in risks when control measures are introduced. Studies of the use of
46TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY § 87 (1912).
47 KINBERG, op. cit. supra note 3, at 127-38.
483 RADZiNoWiCZ, HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW (1957).
4 9 MOORE & CALLAHAN, LAW AND LEARNING THEORY: A STUDY IN LEGAL
CONTROL (1943).
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lie detector tests in American business enterprises have indicated wide-
spread dishonesty even among those who are ordinarily held above
suspicion, and they also have shown that such tests have a deterrent
value upon the future conduct of employees. °
(3) Experiments. Any change of a legal provision or a policy
of the police, prosecuting authorities or the courts is, in a way, an
experiment. Although such alterations are primarily made to gain
certain effects, not to increase our knowledge, to a certain degree they
may be made with a view to research. Moore and Callahan's study
of parking included experiments conducted in concert with the police
authorities. Another experiment recently initiated in Finland attempts
to appraise the deterring effect of fines imposed for drunkenness."-
The local police of three middle-sized towns have agreed to reduce
heavily the percentage of prosecutions for persons arrested for drunken-
ness. The results of the experiment are to be measured principally
by comparing the number of arrests for drunkenness before and after
the change. Other towns, especially three towns with approximately
the same number of inhabitants and the same number of arrests for
drunkenness as the three experiment towns, are to be used as controls.
The results of the experiment are not yet available. It seems doubtful,
however, that the difference in stimuli in this experiment is suffi-
ciently great to produce conclusive results.
It seems realistic to assume that legal, administrative and economic
considerations will impose rather narrow limits for purely research
motivated experiments. It is more economical to await alterations
which are made for other than experimental reasons and to use the
opportunity to promote optimal research conditions with a view to
recording the effects.
(4) Research on motivation, communication and personality
development. The kind of research I have been discussing is socio-
statistical. It aims at uncovering connections between changes in the
function of the legal apparatus and changes in criminality. Even where
such connections have been discovered, nothing has been directly
revealed about the psychological mechanisms at work, and it is there-
fore difficult to generalize about the results. Accordingly, research
must also probe the individual links in the theories of general pre-
vention. Instead of trying to give direct answers to questions about
the effect of the penal law on behavior, one may break the main
problem into partial problems accessible to research. Perhaps Aubert
6o BERR=, PRACTicAL PSYCHOLOGY 454-55 (1946).
51 Related to the author by Professor Inkeri Anttila, Helsinki. See also the 1954
experiment of the New York Police, note 27 supra.
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is right when he contends that "the problem of general prevention con-
stitutes a huge mosaic. The bulk of the stones constituting it must be
obtained from general sociology and social psychology." 5
Thus far in this article I have touched on a good many empirical
questions to which we do not know the answers. How widespread
and detailed is popular knowledge about legal norms? What are the
attitudes toward the legal machinery, and how common is aggression
or indifference as opposed to positive support? What proportion of
the population has the feelings of guilt and the urge for punishment so
often referred to by psychoanalysts? To what extent do criminals
think of the risks when they plan or perform a punishable act, and how
realistic is their estimate of the risks? How do people at large react
to risks? These are questions which focus on the problems already
discussed. In addition there are questions related to communication
theory. How is knowledge about legislation and the legal machinery
transmitted? What is the role of mass media as compared to personal
contacts, and what connections exist between the forms of information
and their motivating power?
We may also ask how the threat of punishment influences the
psychological processes of potential criminals. The following two
step hypothesis has been put forward. A person refraining from a
desired action because of a penal threat will experience dissonance.
Since an effective way of reducing dissonance is by derogating the
action, he will then convince himself that he really did not want to
do it. In testing this hypothesis, it is essential to determine the manner
and degree to which the process depends on the severity of the
punishment.53
We may also analyze the development and internalization of
moral conceptions by individuals. What is the influence of police,
punishment and prison in the socialization process? To what extent
does the penal law indirectly influence child rearing practices by instill-
ing in parents a desire to prevent their children from coming into
conflict with the law and the legal machinery? What defensive
mechanisms may be utilized by the criminal to convince himself that
his violation is not really a criminal act? What are the psychological
effects on the law abiding citizen when he sees crimes committed with
impunity? Surely psychologists and sociologists can formulate such
questions in a manner that makes them answerable by empirical re-
search and in a manner that attunes them to research already completed.
52 AuBERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 177.
5 See 3 EXCERPTA CRIMINOLOGICA 23 (1962) (abstract of Aronson & Carlimith,
The Effect of Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior, 17
THE AMMEICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 300 (1962)).
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VII. COMPARISONS WITH CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH
Crime can be combatted by both threats of punishment and various
social measures. In recent years, an enormous interest in the effects
of crime prevention programs, especially in the field of juvenile de-
linquency, has developed in the United States. According to an
estimate in a recent report to the Council of Europe, about one hundred
million dollars will be spent on preventive research in the United States
in the five year period beginning in 1965."' The major objective of
the well known Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was to test the
hypothesis that delinquency can be prevented and good character
development fostered by the presence of an adult "friend" who will
stand by the boy through ups and downs and offer him the oppor-
tunities and moral guidance normally supplied by parents. The study
disproved such an hypothesis.5 Walter Miller's recent study of the
impact of a "total-community" delinquency control project reached a
similar conclusion." The Miller study was concerned with three
possible factors behind delinquent behavior: the community, the family
and the gang. The finding was that all the effort expended seemed to
have a negligible impact.
There are marked similarities between rating the effects of crime
prevention programs and assessing the results of changes in a penal
system. In both cases a new set of conditions is introduced. The
researcher is faced with the difficult task of assessing changes in
criminality and, if such changes are found to exist, of judging whether
the change is causally connected with the innovation. In a way, in-
vestigation of the effects of change in the penal system is usually a
simpler task than estimating the effects of crime prevention programs.
Such programs often are made up of a whole series of different
activities so that even when we succeed in verifying that a change has
resulted, we cannot know what parts of the program are instrumental
in producing the effects. The same difficulties present themselves when
changes in the repression of crime are introduced as part of a more
extensive action plan. Let me give two examples, one from Denmark
and the other from the United States.
During the first years of World War II the number of bicycle
thefts in Copenhagen increased substantially. By April 1942, the
number of cases was three times the average annual number in the
years before the war. The police decided to strike on several fronts
64 Cm isT REsF-RcH INTO METHODS OF CR=m PRaTENTIox (Report to the
European Council No. DPC/CDIR 10, 1964).
15 5 PoWERs & WrnmER, AN EXPERI MENT IN THE PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY:
THE CAMBRIDGE-SOERVILLE YOUTH STUDY (1951).
5 8Miller, The Impact of a "Total-Community" Delinquency Control Project,
10 SoCAL. PROBT-ES 168 (1962).
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so as to reduce criminality in this field. The police division which
dealt with bicycle thefts was expanded. The courts were asked to
be strict with bicycle thieves. In addition a meeting was arranged be-
tween the police and representatives of the leading Copenhagen news-
papers, during which the head of the police detection division
emphasized the serious consequences of the steadily increasing number
of bicycle thefts. He argued that bicycle theft should be regarded as
an asocial action of a markedly serious character and that it ought
to be most strongly condemned by the public, especially in view of the
shortage of bicycles during the war. The press was asked to advise
citizens to secure their bicycles properly and to notify the police of any
information which might be relevant to bicycle stealing. The public
was also strongly warned against purchasing bicycles or parts of
bicycles from unknown persons. The press found the subject matter
to be "good news," and the plea to the public made the front pages.
The newspapers then published daily notices about bicycle thefts, em-
phasizing the severity of the sentences. The campaign created a lively
interest on the part of the public, judging from the vast number of
reports to the police which in many cases led to a solution of the
crime. The outcome of the campaign exceeded even the most opti-
mistic expectations. The number of complaints during the subsequent
months was less than half the number in April, and the decline proved
lasting. The author of a report on this matter does not estimate
which conditions were decisive in achieving the result. 7 It may have
come about because of the increase of the police force, the intensification
of the penalties, the change of attitude and the growing awareness of
the public, or some combination of these.
The American example concerns a program carried out by the
Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor. When the Com-
mission was established in 1953, conditions in the harbor were said
to be deplorable:
Large-scale stealing on an organized basis prevailed. Pay-
rolls of steamship companies and stevedoring outfits were
padded with "phantom" employees who collected paychecks
for little or no work. Loan-sharking existed to a large
degree. The investigative bodies also revealed corrupt pay-
ments by management to labor leaders to overlook legitimate
labor rights. Guards were threatened with loss of life or
job if too vigorous in their attempt to prevent stealing. Many
union officials were proven to be criminals with extensive
records. And there were many other abuses. . . . It was
felt that the Port of New York was in danger of losing its
07 3 GLUD, KAmgPN 4QD FORBRYDELSEN 396 (1951).
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position of supremacy to which its natural advantages entitled
it-all because of the mess of corruption, venality and general
turbulence.53
The Waterfront Commission has operated both through strict law
enforcement-assisted by a staff of well-qualified investigators-and
by means of a series of control measures. The latter include registra-
tion or licensing of longshoremen, checkers, pier superintendents, hiring
agencies, stevedoring companies and steamship companies. Individuals
who have extensive criminal records or who are tied directly to un-
savory activity with the waterfront mob are denied registration or
licensing. It is difficult to judge what part of the program has been
most effective, but on the whole it appears to have been a remarkable
success. This, at any rate, is the conclusion drawn by Thomas F.
Coon:
Not yet ten years of age, the Waterfront Commission of
N. Y. Harbor has had a profound impact upon the Port of
New York and the lives of the men who work the piers. It
has assuredly improved the manner of living of the waterfront
workers and has done much to foster a more efficient,
economical, and safer movement of trade. 9
However discouraging the conclusion may be, it seems clear that
at present there is definitely more proof of the efficacy of repressive
measures than of those crime preventing measures that have a different
theoretical basis. An enthusiastic reformer some years ago argued:
"If the community cannot afford both police and guidance experts,
then it would do better to choose guidance experts." 6o On the basis of
our present knowledge, this must be characterized as wishful thinking.
Without a police force, guidance experts would have few opportunities
to do their jobs.
VIII. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH GENERAL PREVENTION
The use of any coercive measure raises ethical problems. This is
so even when the motive rests upon the need to treat the person in
question. To what extent are we justified in imposing upon someone
a cure which he does not desire, and how are we to balance con-
siderations in favor of his liberty against the need to eliminate the
hazards he inflicts on society? Such problems are encountered in the
public health services as well as in the exercise of criminal justice.
58 Coon, Waterfront Commisdon Investigator, 3 ExCMETA C.M=NOLOGIcA 369-70
(1963).
69 Id. at 371.
0 Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRinm. L., C. &
P.S. 347 (1955), citing LANDis, SOCIAl. PocIEs IN THE MAKI G 185 (1952).
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The conflict, however, assumes special proportions in connection
with general prevention. It has often been said that punishment, in
this context, is used not to prevent future violations on the part of the
criminal, but in order to instill lawful behavior in others. The indi-
vidual criminal is merely an instrument; he is sacrificed in a manner
which is contrary to our ethical principles. This objection carries
least weight in relation to general preventive notions connected with
legislation. The law provides, for example, that whoever is found
guilty of murder is liable to life imprisonment or that whoever drives
a car when he is intoxicated is to be given a prison sentence of thirty
days. Such penal provisions have been laid down with an aim to
preventing anyone from performing the prohibited acts. If we accept
the provisions as ethically defensible, we also have to accept the punish-
ment prescribed in each individual case. As H. L. A. Hart has
stated:
The primary operation of criminal punishment consists
simply in announcing certain standards of behavior and
attaching penalties for deviation, making it less eligible, and
then leaving individuals to choose. This is a method of social
control which maximizes individual freedom within the
coercive framework of law in a number of different ways.
8'
The question, however, comes to a head when the individual
penalty is decided by general prevention considerations, in other
words, exemplary penalties. I have previously mentioned the sen-
tences given in connection with the race riots in London in 1958.
According to the newspaper bulletins, the penalties assessed in the
earlier cases were lenient, ranging from six weeks to three months.
As the riots continued, the courts introduced heavy penalties of four
years of imprisonment. "A groan of surprise came from the audience
when the judgments were read," a correspondent reported. "On the
galleries were seated the mothers of several of the boys, and they were
led outside, weeping. Two of the boys were themselves totally
paralyzed by the sentences and had to be helped out of the dock to
their cells below the courtroom." The reporter continues: "After
the encounters in West London, however, the race riots have waned
away just as quickly as they started. The reason why they came to
an end is undoubtedly the strong public reaction against racial persecu-
tion together with the resolute intervention of the police and the
courts." '
If the correspondent is right,0 the unusually heavy penalties in
this case had a desirable effect, but the judgment is nevertheless felt
61 HART, PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT 21-22 (1960).
62 Aftenposten, Sept 20, 1958, p. 20.
63 See generally WOOTTON, CRIME AN ) THE CRIMNA. LAW 100-01 (1963).
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to be ethically problematic. There is an element of ex post facto law
involved in such sentences. Although the judge operates within the
framework of the law, such sentences are not, in fact, applications
of previously established norms. The judge establishes a norm to
suit the situation. Nor does the result square with the ideal of
equality before the law. The procedure calls to mind a practice
which-at least according to historical novels-was commonly used
in former times when a number of soldiers committed mutiny or
similar grave violations: the commanding officer would have a suit-
able number of soldiers shot in order to instill fear and give warning,
and the remaining soldiers were readmitted to service without penalty.
Such ethical doubts become even stronger if the individual sen-
tence depends upon the kind of publicity-and hence the kind of
preventive effect-which is expected. Suppose a judge is faced with
two similar cases within a short interval. In the first case, the court-
room is filled with journalists, and the outcome of the trial is likely to
become known to millions of readers. In the second case, the listener's
benches are empty and, in all probability, the verdict will not spread
far beyond the circles of those who are present in the courtroom. Is
it defensible for the judge to pass heavy judgment in the first instance
because the sentence is likely to gain much publicity and consequently
bring about strong general preventive effects, while the defendant in the
second case is merely given a warning because punishment in his case
would only mean personal suffering, and would not yield results from
a social point of view? Such speculation upon the general preventive
effects of the individual sentence easily become tinged with cynicism
and for ethical reasons this approach is only acceptable within very
narrow limits.
1966)
